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Carrots and Sticks in Bank 
Governance: Time for a Bigger 
Stick? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose — This paper is pre-occupied with how bank governance can be altered to reduce 
risk taking and engender greater financial stability. 
 
Design/methodology/approach — Its approach is to review existing bank governance 
arrangements, contemporary challenges, and alternative reforms.  
 
Findings — It is argued that recent reforms are incomplete. Greater countervailing incentives 
for bank managers and shareholders are required. This prompts an inquiry into the merits and 
demerits of four types of reform: changes to executive compensation arrangements; the 
introduction of a liability standard for directors; the removal of limited liability for bank 
shareholders; and a criminal offence for managers.  
 
Originality/value — Discussion illumines several problems with the current approach to 
bank governance and provides insights that can help direct future reform. 
 
Keywords Banking Law, Banking Reform, Banking Regulation, Corporate Governance 
 
Paper type Research paper 
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The parlous condition of markets makes protecting financial stability difficult. As regulators 
continue to disentangle the issues evinced by the financial crisis of 2007, circumstances 
appear to be outpacing reforms. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have 
commenced a program of rate rises, and global debt, the IMF reports in its Spring meeting 
(2018), currently stands at 225 per cent of global gross domestic product — 12 percentage 
points higher than at its previous peak in 2009. As to the future economic outlook, a brexit 
shaped fog obscures it. Since the financial crisis, much energy has been dispensed reforming 
structural regulation. Banks were especially pilloried for lacking the capital to absorb losses 
(Vickers, 2011; Admati, 2014). This helped catalyse adjustments to capital adequacy 
requirements to make banks more resilient to economic shocks. Another structural upheaval, 
commonly referred to as “ring-fencing”, separates investment activities from core retail 
banking functions. Efforts have also been made to address the perceived problems in the 
levels of liquidity and insolvency laws. The overall tenor of the response is a familiar one. In 
the event of market failure, policymakers often engage in a regulatory arms race predicated on 
the belief that regulation is the only recourse. Structural regulations loaded with ingots of 
detail, however, are unlikely to sufficiently moderate market behaviour and improve cultural 
underpinnings. Indeed, a spate of recent scandals which include mis-selling, LIBOR 
(Wheatley, 2012), and FOREX aver the collapse of structural regulatory certainties. And in 
the specific case of ring-fencing, the policy is apt to increase the likelihood of failure within 
one part by concentrating riskier activities and losses. If risk taking is to be reduced and bank 
culture improved then part of the regulatory puzzle involves figuring out how to alter insider 
behaviour. This is the gravamen of corporate governance. And, while much ink has been 
spilled arguing over specific lines of regulation, less has been written about how bank 
governance should be transformed. This paper seeks to contribute to that particular 
conversation. It is divided into five principal sections. The first section introduces the 
conventional model of corporate governance. It shows that applying the model, without 
alteration, to banks is a grievous mistake. This drives the conclusion that banks are a special 
case and necessitate a governance approach capable of addressing the problems identified. 
The four proceeding parts explore areas ripe for reform: i) executive compensation; ii) the 
introduction of a liability rule for directors; iii) the removal of limited liability for bank 
shareholders; and iv) the UK criminal offence for reckless management. 
 
2. Carrots and sticks 
 
To understand where the direction of reform ought to be, it is important to begin by tracing 
where the problems in bank governance lie. Although there is a diversity of institutions of 
governance and business culture across developed economies, a great convergence has 
occurred on the basic laws governing the corporate form (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2002). 
There is, for example, a widespread consensus that managers should act in the economic 
interests of shareholders. And this shareholder-orientated model is supported by corporate 
law, international business, government, and elite institutions — with, perhaps, some show of 
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reason. As with other types of firms, the separation of management and ownership in banks 
poses a classic agency problem. In the absence of effective governance mechanisms, 
managers are free to pursue their own private agenda, potentially at the expense of the firm’s 
shareholders. Another view holds that managers are risk averse. This is because a bank 
manager’s human capital, reputational capital, private benefits of control, and financial capital 
are typically highly un-diversified. Accordingly, bank failure could impose significant costs 
on the bank’s management that would not be borne by its shareholders. Whichever view 
subscribed to the result is the same: managers deviate from shareholder interests. Hence, the 
importance of executive pay and a market for control. To focus managers on maximising 
investor wealth, and so that high venture projects with positive net present values are not 
rejected, managerial pay has been tethered to the performance of the share price. Indeed, prior 
to the financial crisis, bank executive pay comprised a substantial equity component, in 
particular stock options. It is easy to understand the pull of this policy: options act as a 
powerful “carrot” that aligns managerial and shareholder interests and risk preferences. The 
share price is an observable measure of performance that enables shareholders to hold 
ineffective managers to account. Maximising the stock price also, under several structured 
assumptions, enhances social welfare.  
 Despite its wide use, and endorsement in the academic literature (see, Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Nguyen and Kasper Nielsen, 2014), applying this approach to banks is 
problematic for several reasons. First, banking activities lack transparency. The complexity of 
financial assets mean that they are difficult to observe. Second, banks are highly levered 
firms. Banks transform short-term deposit liabilities into long-term illiquid loan assets. 
Deposit insurance provides a cheap source of debt which can be used to increase the value of 
put options. An exclusive focus on shareholder maximisation, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
explain, encourages excessive risk taking in highly levered firms. This is because 
shareholders are protected by limited liability from the full extent of losses, and yet are able to 
capture the full upside of risks. Therefore, the calculus of investment decisions only takes 
account of the upside. Another consequence of high levels of debt is that banks lack loss 
absorbency. This makes banks fragile and increases the possibility of failure. The fourth 
reason is deeper. When a bank fails, its negative externalities are considerable. These costs 
are heavily borne by taxpayers, who are unable to accurately price into their contracts with 
banks the costs the bank’s default would impose. Failure disrupts the payment system and the 
credit allocation process, which can have systemic consequences. They are systemic because 
the damage is not confined to the financial system; it broadly impacts the economy through its 
effects on asset values and credit availability. Often, there is correlation between investment 
strategies which gives rise to the risk of contagion. Therefore, the failure of one firm may also 
call into question the viability of another invested in the same market. To avoid the costs 
associated with bank failure, governments during the crisis provided pre-emptive bailouts to 
the banking sector. This created an expectation that other financial institutions approaching 
the verge of insolvency could rely on the likelihood of financial assistance from the 
government. Anticipation of bank bailout further incentivises shareholders and managers to 
increase leverage and assume greater risk. These exceptional challenges caution the 
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application of traditional governance to banks. The situation is otherwise leadenly skewed in 
favour of shareholders and managers. What comes through clearly here is the need to offset 
the incentives generated by the use of stock options—the “carrot”—with some form of 
contingent downside consequences—the “stick”.  
 Post-crisis, reforms in bank governance have been largely leisurely and peripheral. 
Many interpreted the financial crisis as evidence that managers were inadequately focused on 
shareholder value. Guided by this interpretation, policy-makers and regulators, in their 
obduracy to fundamental change, showed a renewed commitment to the shareholder-
orientated model. For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision cites, with 
approval, in its Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance (2010) the OECD’s statement 
(2004) that ‘Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders 
and should facilitate effective monitoring.’ Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (2010), which apply to any firm listed on a national US 
exchange, recasts disclosure requirements, introduce a mechanism for claw-backs, and 
mandates advisory “say-on-pay” votes to be held at least once every three years, as well as 
independent compensation committees. There are similarities with the reforms in the EU and 
UK. The EU fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), aimed at all staff who hold 
senior management positions in banks, building societies, and investment firms, also, for 
instance, establishes clawbacks of variable compensation. Other features of CRD IV include a 
cap on variable pay, deferrals of variable compensation, and bonus structure requirements. 
Changes in the UK go further. In addition to the provisions of CRD IV, the UK Remuneration 
Code extends the deferral time horizon. It also prescribes that variable remuneration be risk-
adjusted and employee performance assessed with regard to both financial and non-financial 
factors. That assessment must be based on the performance of the individual, business unit 
concerned, and the overall results of the firm. Proposed revisions to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (FRC, 2017), which covers all companies with a premium listing of equity 
shares in the UK, once implemented, will furnish boards with the ability to overrule 
remuneration outcomes made by management. Remuneration committees will also have an 
expanded remit, with the new responsibility for oversight of company remuneration and 
broader workforce policies.  
 This paper is warm to measures such as claw-backs, and the mandating of deferred 
variable compensation. In particular, the suggestion from the UK Remuneration Code that 
risk-adjusted profits be used as the basis for bonus decisions is welcome. The general 
approach to bank governance, however, retains its flaws. To begin with, these reforms make 
managers more accountable to investors, and serve to prevent managers veering away from 
shareholder interests. This transmits an under-appreciation of the risk appetite of bank 
shareholders, who can carry on pressuring and inducing managers to take risks. If the goal is 
to reduce risk taking and help safeguard financial stability then granting shareholders 
additional control rights is unlikely to achieve this. Another problem concerns the over-
reliance on the stock price as a measure for performance. For example, under CRD IV, at 
least 50 per cent of variable remuneration must consist of shares. The existence of clawback 
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and deferral provisions do not alter the fact that market prices continue to steer the taking of 
risks that exploit the State’s implicit guarantee. Without altering the performance metrics in 
executive pay, and the risk appetite of managers and shareholders, the situation will remain 
one-sided: both will seek to enrich their position at the expense of the State. What is more, 
regulatory prescriptions are not strictly a private corporate governance solution. Their efficacy 
depends on the ability of the regulator to effectively construct and administer suitable rules. 
The entrenched reliance on rules is considered a further weakness in the approach post-crisis. 
Rules need to be properly demarcated in advance, which is particularly difficult to do in this 
sector given the ambit of systemic externalities. Should the pre-specified scope be under-
inclusive, issues of regulatory arbitrage risk becoming exacerbated. Perhaps then a more 
radical change to the bank governance aspic is required. Instead of opting to decrease the size 
of the “carrot” — which raises questions of equity and fairness in executive pay, and are 
outside the scope of this inquiry (see, Villiers, 2010; Kaplan, 2013) — the overarching 
approach promulgated in this paper is to seek the introduction of a “stick” to discourage 
excessive risk taking. This is the focus of the next four sections. 
 
3. Executive compensation 
 
As the previous section indicates, executive pay has come increasingly under the regulatory 
gaze. One of the problems that section identifies is the unflagging reliance on the price of 
stock, with which performance is judged by. Relatedly, the dominant use of stock options in 
executive remuneration packages, which shows little signs of relenting, klaxons concern. 
Acolytes of this approach will likely point to evidence of a positive correlation between 
performance related pay and shareholder return (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). But this is to 
miss the point. Compensation arrangements prior to the crisis produced a number of 
distortions. Managers were incentivised to increase short-term profits even if it created an 
unduly high risk of future large losses (Bebchuk and Fried, 2010). Much of the short-term 
growth was predicated on increased leverage, which resulted in greater capital fragility. 
Distorted compensation practices are moreover contiguous with a dysfunctional culture within 
a firm. In the case of the UK’s PPI mis-selling scandal, the Financial Services Authority 
(2013, para.22) identify, in written evidence to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards, an over zealous concern with targets and bonuses as a “root cause” of the mis-
selling. 
 Support was signalled, in the preceding section, for the introduction of clawbacks. 
However, clawbacks, together with other recent measures, cannot adequately remedy the 
situation. The policy runs into several difficulties. For instance, it is hard to conjure a suitable 
metric for clawback purposes. Should clawbacks be tethered to the performance of stock then 
that threatens punitive action based on exogenous factors outside of managerial control. As a 
result, incentives may become compromised (see further, Gordon, 2009). 
 Equity-linked compensation then should be reduced as a percentage of overall 
remuneration packages. The proceeding question becomes one of metric selection. Several 
proposals show promise. One direction might be to use a broader view of firm value when 
Page 5 of 16 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Regulation and Com
pliance
 
-6- 
determining compensation. Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) put forward a policy change of this 
kind. They propound that pay be indexed to a set percentage of the aggregate value of 
common shares, preferred shares, and all outstanding bonds. The anticipated benefits are two-
fold. First, it would, by exposing managers to a greater fraction of the negative consequences 
of risks taken, lead to a more cautious approach to risk. Second, it would serve to better 
protect bondholders by obviating the redirection of wealth from bondholders to shareholders. 
An immediate problem encountered relates back to an earlier point made about the 
complexity of bank activity. Scores of bank liabilities are not stock-based. And of these, a 
considerable portion are not traded. It is therefore difficult to identify, with an acute degree of 
accuracy, the overall value of bank liabilities. How such a policy could adequately be written 
into regulations is uncertain. As Gordon (2010) highlights, it would require regulators to 
define the elements of the firm’s capital structure that would be included in the compensation 
formula. This would, in turn, induce managers to vary the capital structure to maximise their 
compensation. The resulting balance sheet rearrangement may stimulate inefficiencies and 
fail to reduce systemic risk.  
 An alternative approach, proffered by Gordon (2010), involves awarding managers 
convertible equity-based pay. Upon certain external triggers, such as a downgrade into a high 
risk category by regulators or a deterioration in a key financial ratio, such stock-based 
compensation would turn into subordinated debt. Post the trigger event, managers would 
effectively work for bond holders. Tyin  managerial wealth to the firm has the advantage of 
giving managers an incentive to steer the firm away from financial distress. At least two 
problems emerge from this proposal. First, managers who near dangerously close to the 
conversion point may be encouraged to jettison caution and gamble. Second, due to State 
support, bond holders lack monitoring incentives and therefore cannot be suitably relied on to 
control risk. 
 A third option entails including in executive compensation contracts bond 
performance as well as share prices (Bolton et al, 2015). This approach augurs a closer 
alignment between  managerial and creditor interests. Perhaps, though, too greater a 
convergence between these interests may transpire. And, as a result, managerial predilection 
with risk would be insufficient, potentially negatively impacting on the supply of credit. A 
further problem with this proposal is that usually bond values are much more influenced by 
market-wide interest rate changes than own-firm credit risk changes, and that an already 
fragile alternative measure of single-firm credit risk, credit default swap spreads, will be 
undercut by use as a regulatory device (Armour and Gordon, 2014; Lucas 1976). 
 The potential for incentive structures to alter behaviour is enormous and should not be 
under-appreciated. This section has considered different changes to managerial remuneration 
packages to redress some of the problems identified. While there are problems attached to 
these modifications, they are likely to produce marked improvements to incentives compared 
with existing arrangements. Regulators must, however, resist the temptation of belaying bank 
governance reform there. Such reform has its limits, and if regulatory alteration were to cease 
with executive compensation other issues would continue to imbue financial firms. The types 
of reform considered so far, moreover, are vulnerable to being weakened over time through 
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indefatigable lobbying attempts by the affected financial firms (see further, Coffee, 2012). 
Greater deterrents are needed to adequately truncate excessive risk taking. This is what the 
remainder of the paper will concentrate on. 
 
4. Director liability 
 
Some preliminary remarks on liability are necessary. There exists an anxiety that excessive 
liability will deter risk taking in its entirety and lead to overly cautious investment strategies. 
This situation would not be satisfactory either. Economic welfare and an adequate allocation 
of  resources rely on banks to take some risks — it is a matter of degree. The object is to 
safeguard against socially excessive risk taking not to place an embargo on it altogether. It is 
critical then to seek balance between liability exposure and rewards for risk taking. This 
frames the following discussion on proposed changes to liability structures. 
 Before the reform idea is introduced and its strengths considered, it is helpful to 
establish the current legal position when it comes to director and officer liability. Directors 
and officers benefit from the business judgment rule, which is accommodated in multiple 
jurisdictions. It protects such decision-makers from liability for breach of their duty of care, 
providing a business decision has been taken in good faith and on the basis of adequate 
information. The burden is on the plaintiff to present evidence to the contrary. The most 
commonly cited justification for the rule is to attenuate the problem of managerial reluctance 
to take risks, as described earlier. Chancellor Allen summarises this well in the case of 
Gagliardi v Trifoods International, Inc. (1996) in the Court of Chancery of Delaware: 
 
Shareholders don’t want (or shouldn’t rationally want) directors to be risk averse. 
Shareholders’ investment interests, across the full range of their diversifiable 
equity investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers 
honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk 
adjusted returns available that are above the firm’s cost of capital. 
 
If this protection were to be removed then the warrant to take welfare enhancing risks reduces 
significantly. This drives the view that if business risk taking is to be encouraged, it must first 
be recognised that losses are, to some extent, inevitable. Hence, Chancellor Allen in 
Gagliardi goes on to say: 
 
If…corporate directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a risky 
project on the ground that the investment was too risky…their liability would be 
joint and several for the whole loss…Given the scale of operation of modern 
public corporations, this stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for 
corporate directors threatens undesirable effects. Given this disjunction, only a 
very small probability of director liability based on “negligence”, “inattention”, 
“waste”, etc., could induce a board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects 
to any extent! 
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In the US, this approach has been formalised in the Delaware General Corporation Law 
§102(b)(7), which permits the waiver of liability for any breach of directors’ duties not in bad 
faith. The decision of re Caremark v International Inc. Derivative Litigation (1996), made 
clear that directors do, however, have a continuing duty to ensure that “monitoring systems 
are in place”. The case is of enormous interest; for present purposes attention is particularly 
drawn to two aspects. First, to satisfy this duty, it requires merely a “good faith attempt” to 
make sure that such monitoring systems are in place. Second, liability will only be faced if 
directors have, for example, “utterly failed” to implement oversight. In the UK, the 
Companies Act 2006 s.174 provides an objective duty of care for company directors. It has 
been observed that, in practice, there is a low probability of enforcement (FSA, Report on the 
Failure of RBS, 2011). And, imposing regulatory fines against the company is not particularly 
helpful in the case of banks. Due to the existence of capital requirements and the strenuous 
demands often made on banks’ balance sheets, large financial penalties will impel greater 
fragility. 
 The failure to internalise the systemic risks in the financial sector, combined with the 
limited ways in which existing duties of care apply to directors and officers, has prompted 
Armour and Gordon (2014) to propose a regime of personal liability for oversight. This would 
consist of a review framework as well as an oversight framework. The former would create a 
duty for managers to address the conflicts of interest embedded in high-powered performance 
incentives through obtaining board-level review of risk taking that may give rise to systemic 
harms. As to the latter, the board would have oversight responsibility for the level of risk 
taking by the firm, including risk taking in operations together with strategy. Liability would 
be owed to the firm, and could be triggered by a shareholder action following the occurrence 
of significant losses. Their selected standard of liability is negligence-based. And, according 
to the proposal, courts would begin their assessments by evidencing industry practice, and 
proceed to consider whether the level of oversight precaution undertaken would be thought 
desirable by diversified shareholders. The measure of liability would be based on 
remuneration.  
 It is a proposal grounded in pre-federal deposit insurance US, where, in the event of 
insolvency, bank directors faced liability to creditors under, as it was commonly known as, 
the “trust fund” doctrine. The New York Court of Appeals in the case of Hun v Cary (1880), 
which held bank directors liable on a negligence standard, highlighted the vulnerability of 
depositors and the higher standard of care required for directors of a bank. But then, in 1933, 
the inception of federal deposit insurance catalysed the withdrawal of negligence liability for 
bank officers and directors. 
 The proposal has several merits. Chief among them is, appropriately structured, such 
liability should make agents behave less riskily. This is expected to occur, in part, through 
improved risk oversight. The board level review, tasked with investigating and understanding 
the level of risk attached to bank activities, promises to also determine appropriate risk 
parameters. Once established, continual oversight will ensure risk limits are not exceeded, and 
where necessary, trammel risk taking. The proposal also resolves an issue with deposit 
insurance. Its capacity to protect against systemic risk from bank failure only extends so far 
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— a point well made by Armour and Gordon (2014). In the case of the failure of large 
financial firms, deposit insurance is impotent to the ensuing financial disruption. An expanse 
of vulnerability thus exists. Out of the financial crisis, several mergers materialised. The 
financial system is, as a result, even more concentrated. And stability depends on a few 
financial monoliths perilously perched atop it. Director liability can help fill the space created 
by the exhausted capacity of deposit insurance to safeguard stability. Something else in the 
proposal’s favour is, because enforcement is in the hands of private plaintiffs rather than 
regulators, opportunities for lobbying to undermine its efficacy are much reduced. 
 There is then a compelling primie facie case for introducing this sort of director and 
officer liability. But, probe a little deeper and several problems emerge. First, the imposition 
of liability gives currency to the concern articulated by Chancellor Allen in Gagliardi. Boards 
may opt to avoid authorising risky investment projects in their entirety. The second problem 
has two facets. On the one hand, it may produce strong disincentives for highly skilled and 
experienced individuals to accept director or officerships. And existing directors and officers 
may re-consider their positions and exit. A loss of talent will possibly hinder the 
understanding of risk and the future performance of the firm. On the other hand, while the 
threat of liability should, in theory, mitigate excessive risk taking, it may produce offsetting 
effects as well. In contrast to the first mentioned problem of risk aversion, individuals who 
remain in post or pursue such positions may actually have an undesirably high propensity for 
risk. The second tenable effect is that, in the presence of the proposed duties and oversight 
frameworks, investors and customers become complacent in monitoring and scrutinising the 
riskiness of the bank themselves. There will also be handicaps in determining, in a given 
situation, whether sufficient oversight precautions were undertaken — a likely point of fierce 
contention. While some instances where boards were deficient, such as in the case of loose 
internal controls that permit risk taking beyond agreed upon risk limits, are easily identified, 
others are considerably less clear cut. Another of these problems points towards the preserve 
of bank shareholders. Shareholders remain shielded from losses above their equity holding 
but favourably positioned to benefit from the up-side of excessive risks. This criticism does 
not, on its own, collapse the case for extended director liability. But it does show that reform 
should not stop there, otherwise it would still be incomplete. Something more is needed. And 
it is to that prospective option that this paper turns to next. 
 
5. Shareholder liability 
 
So far, this paper has considered reforms aimed at managers and directors. These, together 
with existing policy changes, can play a part in modifying their behaviour. However, there is 
one group yet to be adequately dealt with: shareholders. Recent measures enhance their 
powers. This is problematic. Currently, losses for shareholders are restricted to the equity held 
at the time of failure. In the absence of countervailing incentives for shareholders, their 
socially excessive risk appetite is also kept in a pristine state. Shareholders, as a result, are 
able to continue apace to pressure managers to take on more risks. For example, managers 
may be threatened with removal or loss of control if they reject risky projects that would 
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increase the share price. Valorising this account further, Ferreira et al (2013) provide evidence 
that bank managers who were less insulted from their shareholders took on more risk. They 
also show that bank managers fully insulated from shareholders are roughly 18 to 26 
percentage points less likely to be bailed out.  
 The above justifies an inquiry into ways of curtailing the risk preferences of bank 
shareholders. It has been suggested that the rule of limited liability should be removed for 
shareholders of the bank (Ridyard, 2013). Such a policy change has the benefit of being a 
market-based solution. Modifications to the liability structure should yield at least two 
desirable outcomes. First, additional liability exposure acts as a deterrent to excessive risk 
taking. Bank shareholders are impelled to reduce their risk appetite. If this bears out then they 
will be able to better monitor and control risk from a social welfare perspective. Second, in 
the event of failure, internalisation of the costs of failure increases through the additional 
costs imposed on shareholders. 
 The policy change takes flight from banking history. Between 1863 and 1935, US 
banks mostly operated on a system of double liability. Under double liability, shareholders of 
a failed bank were liable for the initial cost of their shares plus as much as the par value of 
their shares to cover the bank’s losses. Evidence from this era supports the two projected 
outcomes of removing limited limited liability postulated earlier. Grossman (2001), for 
example, finds that banks subject to double liability held a lower proportion of risky assets, 
had higher capital and liquidity ratios, and were less likely to fail. And, in another study, 
Macey and Miller (1992) reveal that, based on the failures of national banks in the US during 
the regime of limited liability, depositors were suitably protected from losses: on average, for 
every $1000 in deposits in a given year, depositors lost just 44 cents.  
 Throughout the late 19th and early 20th century, the UK imposed additional liability 
on shareholders by having firms issue partly paid shares for less than their nominal value. 
Such shares carried contingent liability for the remaining uncalled capital which, at the 
discretion of managers, shareholders were liable for. In an illuminating work, Grossman and 
Imai (2013) find that prior to World War I, UK banks operating under stricter liability rules 
undertook less risk than those operating with lower levels of contingent liability. Put together, 
there is a strong argument in favour of reverting back to a system of contingent liability. But 
for this policy change to make sense, the costs and downside consequences must not dwarf its 
merits. This point will now be considered.  
 As to the implementation of contingent liability, in the US, courts co-operated with 
administrative agencies and legislatures to craft radiantly clear and easily applied rules to 
govern the administration of the system (Macey and Miller, 1992). Problems were, to all 
appearances, satisfactorily resolved. For example, the courts tackled opportunistic transfers to 
insolvent parties with relative ease, as can be seen in the case of National Bank v Case (1878). 
This is not to say it was a costless exercise. It was not. Substantial resources were necessary 
to detect and deal with evasion techniques, and penurious shareholders unable to meet 
assessments impacted on recovery rates and generated costs. How might recovery work 
today? The significant increase in the number of multi-national banks suggests enforcement 
will be more difficult. As Goodhart (2013) explains, so long as most banks only had a few 
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wealthy owners, the system of double liability worked well; but once shareholding became 
widely distributed, both the quantum and timing of such extra funding became doubtful. 
There are also sophisticated means available to investors to obfuscate the recovery process, 
such as specialised holding structures. An approach similar to the one adopted in the US has 
been proffered (Ridyard, 2013) comprising legislative action and judicial decisions to 
establish enforcement mechanisms. Courts, as part of that proposal, are to have the authority 
to declare any efforts to evade additional liability within the corporate form invalid. Concerns 
over arbitraging the scope of recovery are therefore mitigated since standards will be 
developed by the courts ex post. Given the added complexities of addressing evasion and 
recovery, costs will inevitably swell. Sufficiently resourced, and such a framework becomes 
workable. 
 Changes to the liability structure produces a further concern: the cost of equity. In a 
regime of contingent liability, the marketability of shares will plausibly be adversely 
impacted. This may lead to a rise in the cost of equity. Conti-Brown (2011) rebuts this 
criticism by claiming that the cost of equity will more accurately reflect and internalise risk. 
Understand, market efficiency is a public good (Directive 2003/71/EC; US National 
Securities Market Improvement Act 1996). Currently, the extent of risk is arguably not fully 
impounded in the price. Rather, it mirrors the one-sided situation described earlier. Priced 
more accurately, the calculus to determine investment projects should include the wider social 
costs. 
 There is also a problem of political aesthetics. An instructive example is the case of 
the City of Glasgow bank. In October 1878, as one of the UK’s largest banks, it collapsed 
leaving a chasm between its assets and liabilities (Acheson and Turner, 2008). That shortfall 
was met entirely by its shareholders, who, like many other British bank shareholders at the 
time, were subject to joint and several unlimited liability. The regime was effective in 
protecting the bank’s depositors from loss: no depositor befell a loss. Shareholders, on the 
other hand, fared much worse with only 254 of its 1819 solvent after the bank’s liquidation. 
This was seized upon by limited liability laity, such as The Economist, who, with dogged 
intensity called for an end to extended liability. Politicians too, helped transform public 
opinion on limited companies from one of hostility to one of acceptance (Acheson and 
Turner, 2008; Jefferys, 1977). And so, with an afflatus and the sweep of the legislative pen, 
the Companies Act 1879 was passed, which facilitated the conversion of banks to limited 
liability. In the recent financial crisis, governments prolapsed under pressure to financially 
backstop the banking sector. Contingent liability will only work if banks are shorn of the 
expectation of bailout. Governments must allow banks to fail and be willing to incur some of 
the costs of failure. Due to the special economic properties of banks, this forecast is not 
entirely certain. Nevertheless, the winds of change give reason for some degree of optimism. 
Recent rhetoric has signalled a commitment to ending bank bailouts. Mark Carney (2016) 
describes the Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL), which is 
a requirement under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, as a significant 
milestone on the journey to end Too Big To Fail in the UK. Similarly, in the US, House 
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Speaker Paul Ryan (2017) claims that the Financial Choice Act ends the era of taxpayer-
funded bailouts and too big to fail. 
 Of course, resistance to this proposal will be considerable, and implementation costly. 
Investiture in the sacred status of limited liability, however, is misplaced. Contingent liability 
could be effective in deterring risk-taking and providing a cushion against losses, reducing 
State exposure.   
 
6. Criminalisation 
 
The dynamic in the post-crisis contaminated environment was public disapprobation: 
something must be done to change the culture of banks. The dearth of criminal prosecutions  
of bankers produced a perception of unfairness. Criminal law seemed to target small scale 
misconduct but disclaimed an interest in those responsible for the economic turmoil caused by 
the financial crisis. In the UK, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards  (PCBS) 
agreed, concluding in its report (June, 2013) that there is a strong case in principle for a new 
criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank. Perhaps, in part to sate 
the public’s appetite for retribution, the offence was introduced by section 34 of the Financial 
Service (Banking Reform) Act 2013. The UK Treasury eulogised the act, describing it as the 
‘biggest reform to the UK banking sector in a generation’. Four possible standards of liability 
for the offence were considered: recklessness, strict liability, incompetence, and negligence. 
Accordingly, a recklessness standard was deemed most appropriate. The offence applies only 
to senior managers — for the purposes of the act both executive and non-executive board 
members are viewed as “senior managers”. It carries a maximum sentence following 
conviction of seven years imprisonment.  
 The offence reflects a more Hobbesian way of achieving norm compliance by using 
punitive repercussions. And the more ubiquitous the monitoring, so the theory runs, the 
likelier it is moral transgressions will be detected and punishment meted. The effectiveness of 
the sanction relies on the extent to which the deterrent is a credible one. If it is credible then 
the measure has latent behaviour-altering potential. But, this is where the question mark is 
finely poised. There are several factors that limit the efficacy of the offence. The first is a 
resource issue. Effective monitoring and supervision, as Black and Kershaw (2013) observe, 
need significant resources. Inevitably, there are asymmetries of knowledge, expertise, and 
resources between regulators and the regulated. Regulators, as a result, are put at a structural 
disadvantage. Resource constraints may also impact on enforcement. Regulators have finite 
resources and therefore have to prioritise, with great care, where those resources should be 
allocated. The cost barriers to enforcement are far from trivial, especially if the firm defends 
the individual. Plausibly, there will be instances, should resources be insufficient, when 
bringing an action is prohibitively expensive. With Brexit lurking, the pressures on regulator 
budgets are worsening. The FCA, for instance, in their 2018/19 annual business plan indicate 
that it has to make, ‘difficult and challenging decisions about our priority activities across all 
business areas that are not related to work on EU withdrawal, including limiting the number 
of new initiatives we’ve taken on.’ But, even if the coffers are full, the prospects of successful 
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prosecution seem remote. This is because establishing liability for an individual is replete 
with difficulties. First, causation must be made out. Recall, banks are opaque and their 
activities complex. A myriad of reasons can often explain a bank failure. Isolating a senior 
manager’s decision that directly resulted in firm failure is possibly an insurmountable task. 
Second, a related point, it is also necessary to prove that the senior manager was aware of the 
risk that the implementation of a decision may lead to bank failure. On this, delegated 
authority provides potential for avoidance. An additional limitation is also worth mentioning: 
for any investigation to commence a bank must first be allowed to “fail”. In much the same 
way as the previous policy change, this involves removing the expectation of bank bailout. It 
remains to be seen whether, as a bank teeters on the brink of failure, government is able to 
resist the atavism to intervene with financial assistance. 
 Suppose convictions do become par for the course. This brings a different set of 
concerns to the fore. Conceivably, high conviction rates will render experienced and highly 
competent individuals reluctant to pursue, or continue to hold, senior management positions. 
It also threatens the adoption of an overly risk averse culture, which may vitiate the appeal of 
the UK’s financial industry and impact on regulator behaviour. 
 The momentum for reform has not been entirely squandered. Other jurisdictions 
would do well to propagate a criminal offence of this kind. Despite the noted limitations, the 
criminal sanction, provided by the 2013 Act, transmits a message of closer regulatory scrutiny 
of the responsibilities of individuals. And, as the PCBS suggest in its report, it ought to ‘give 
pause for thought to the senior officers of UK banks’. Punishment enthusiasts should not be 
too sanguine with their expectations, though. If John Coffee’s regulatory sine curve (2012) 
plays out, and an upturn in the economy combines with a decline in public pressure, then 
there is a danger that the turmoil of the crisis becomes evanescent and a “light touch” 
approach returns.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that the current approach to bank governance is deficient in at least two 
ways. First, there is a preserved over-dependency on equity-linked metrics of performance. 
This is apt to induce excessive risk taking, particularly when stock options form a large part 
of managerial compensation packages. The second deficiency lies in the scant recognition of 
the unbridled risk hunger of bank shareholders. Bank shareholders are not yet a good proxy 
for societal interests, and therefore cannot be relied on to effectively monitor and control 
risks. This paper has attempted to remedy these deficiencies by exploring four types of reform 
that introduce various kinds of “sticks”, with contingent downside consequences. The 
countervailing incentives produced suggest that such policy changes could compliment 
existing measures in discouraging excessive risk taking and helping to safeguard financial 
stability. 
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